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Thisarticle investigates factors that affect whether people will construct attitudes based onex-
ternal information from others, their owndirect experience. orsome combination ofthetwo. Ev-
idence from two studies suggests thatconsumers' salient goals and the orderand degree of
favorability associated with thetwotypes of information (external vs, experiential) arefactors
that may jointly determine attitude construction. In study I, participants who were in an
evaluative (nonevaluative) frame ofmind were more likely toconstruct theirattitudes based on
initial (recent) diagnostic information regarding theattitude object (i.e.•anadvertisement). Par-
ticipants appear touse ananchoring andadjustment process toconstruct theirattitudes. Instudy
2.to further testthisanchoring and adjustment explanation, weusethewell-established finding
thatpeople sometimes express attitude behaviors inlinewith athird party'sviews. When athird
party created anexternal contingency. participants nolonger systematically anchored on prior
or recent information toward theattitude object. Theresults of these twostudies point out the
usefulness of identifying (a) processes of attitude construction. and(b)processes of how con-
sumers determine whether a generated attitude is an appropriate guide fortheirbehavior. The
findings arediscussed in terms ofthecurrent retrieval versus construction debate intheattitude
literature.
Some attitude research appears to be based on the assumption
that people walk around with stored attitudes toward some
objects. In fact, the classic and more recent definitions of an
attitude (e.g., a predisposed tendency to respond to something
in a favorable way; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) reflect this prem-
ise, as does work demonstrating the functional usefulness of
possessing a particular state of readiness to respond to classes
of objects (Katz, 1960; Shavitt, 1990; Smith Bruner & White,
1956). Therefore. some attitudes are quite stable and resistant
to change (see Bennett, 1975; Bishop, Hamilton, &
McConahay, 1980; Brown, 1970, for a discussion on the sta-
bility of political attitudes).
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However, given cognitive capacity limitations, people
probablydo not have stored attitudes toward the infinite num-
ber of objects in their social world. In fact, a more contempo-
rary school of thought has conceptualized (some types of)
attitudes as temporary constructions (Schwarz & Bohner,
2000; Tesser, 1978; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Wilson &
Hodges, 1992; Wyer & Hartwick, 1980; Zanna, 1990; Zanna
& Rempel, 1988). According to this constructionist view-
point, (Bettman, Luce, & Payne 1998; Feldman & Lynch,
1988; Schwartz, 1978; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988), an at-
titude is likely to be heavily influenced by the accessibility
and salience of whateverattitude-relevant information comes
to mind when an attitude is called for. In this view, attitudes
that are not directly retrieved from memory (Fazio, Chen,
McDonel, & Shennan, 1982) might be the result of a dy-
namic, construction process in which "there is not a single at-
titude toward an object, but rather any number of attitudes
depending on the number of different schemas available for
thinking about the object" (Tesser, 1978, pp. 297-298).
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The focusof this article is on the interplay of two particular
schemasthat may leadto attitudeformation. An attitudeobject
can be thoughtof intermsofexternalinformation abouttheob-
ject.' Anattitudeobjectcanalso bethoughtof in termsof a per-
son's directexperiencewith theobject(Regan& Fazio, 1977).
When attitudesarc constructed,these twoinputs-external in-
formation from others and one's own direct experience--ean
be combined in predictable ways to form an evaluation of a
novel object. Attitude constructionshould depend on at least
two factors: (a) salientgoals that affect theaccessibility of ex-
ternalorexperiential information whenan attitudeiscalledfor,
and (b) the relativediagnosticity (valence)of the information
to the impendingjudgment (Feldman& Lynch, 1988). Based
on thesetwoassertions, thepurposeofthis articleisto formally
test the attitudeconstruction process.The restof this article is
organizedas follows. Two keyaspectsof theattitudeliterature
are brieflydiscussed: (a)external informational influence, and
(b)directexperience. Two studiesarc thenpresentedthatdem-
onstratethe fluidness of attitudeconstructionandhowattitudes
towardthe sameobjectcan significantly shiftdependingon re-





A person can form an attitude based on external information
from others. Obtaining factual evidence about an evaluated
object has beendescribed in the literatureas informational in-
fluence (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelman, 1961; Park &
Lessig, 1977).For example,considcrconstructing an attitude
toward tofu by readingabout tofu in a cuisine magazine.How
a person's attitude is influenced by this external information
depends on many factors. Does the person have an accessible
previousattitude toward tofu? Is it strong, weak,and so forth?
Docs the person have the ability or motivation to process the
new information (Eagly & Chaiken, I993)? Therefore, it is
thought that informational influence operates through a pro-
cess of internalization (Kelman, 1961).That is, when infor-
mation is internalized, it will not be accepted in toto but will
be modified to fit the unique experiences of the target.
Direct Experience
A personcan also forman attitude based on his or herown di-
rect experience with the attitude object. Attitudes formed on
the basis of direct experience with the attitude object are
better predictors of behavior than are attitudes formed with-
'See Zanna and Rempel (1988) for the argument that attitudes can be
based on affective, cognitive. or behavioral infonnation.
out such experience (Regan & Fazio, 1977; Songer-Nocks,
1976).Forexample,consider formingan attitude towardtofu
by sampling tofu in a kiosk in the grocery store. It is thought
that an attitude generated on the basis of direct experience is
more likely to be salient (accessible) in memory, and hence
generated very quickly (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman
1982;Fazio& Zanna, I978b) on subsequentexposure to cues
related to the attitude object (e.g., seeing an ad for tofu bur-
gers).This raisesan interestingquestion: What moderates the
relativeuse of alternativeschemas that might impact the tem-
porary construction of attitudes?
MODERATORS OF SCHEMA IMPACT
Salient Goals and Accessibility
Consider constructing an attitude based on two alternative
schemas: (a) external information from others about the object;
and (b) direct experience withthe object. As priorresearch sug-
gests, goalsmayinfluence thebasis onwhich anattitude isfonned
(Bagozzi, Henderson, Dabholkar, & Iacobucci 1996; Huffman &
Houston, 1993; King & Balasubramanian, 1994; Lassiter, Geers,
Apple, & Beers, 2000; Petermen, 1997). For example. imagine
twodifferent consumers whohavebothfirst (a) read extensively
abouttofuand whothenhave(b) subsequently sampled tofuatthe
grocery store. Prior to reading abouttofu, one of the consumers
wasabouttoembarkona newdietprogram; hence, thisconsumer
is interested in evaluating possible consumption alternatives. in-
cluding tofu. Theotherconsumerhadnosuchgoal.Bothconsum-
ersnowfindthemselves ina situation in which theyrequire anat-
titude to guide theirbehavior. How might thesetwo consumers
construct an attitude? Consider first theconsumer whose goal or
current concern (Klinger, 1975) during tofuexposure wassped fi-
callydirected toward forming an eventual evaluation of tofuali a
dietalternative. Because thatgoalwassalient priortoboth reading
aboutthetofuand sampling it. theconsumer might anchor on the
initial information received regarding theobject(e.g., article from
thecuisine magazine) andadjust theattitude relative todirect ex-
perience with the object (e.g., sampling the tofu at the grocery
store). In thisexample, theconsumer'sconstructed attitude should
reflect a primacy effect Initial information will be moreheavily
weighted, and thenadjusted for information considered later(i.e.,
theconsumer's directexperience withtheobjcct.) Nowconsider
the consumer withnosuchevaluative goal salient priorto being
exposed to the tofuarticle in thecuisine magazine and sampling
tofu in the grocery store. When an attitude toward tofu is later
called for, thisconsumer may focus on information thatis more
easily retrievable from memory, givencognitive capacity limita-
tions (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler,
2000). In this example, the consumer's constructed attitude re-
flects a recency effectinasmuch as theconsumer anchors on the
more recent information (sampling the tofu in thegrocery store)
andadjusts fortheevaluative implications of thelessrecent exter-
nal information thatcan be recalled (thearticle from thecuisine
magazine).
The Diagnosticity of External Information
and Direct Experience
An attitude based on direct experience is a custom-made attitude
toward that specific attitude object. Fazio and Zanna (1978a,
I978b) emphasized the effect of direct experience on the confi-
dence, certainty, and clarity with which the attitude is held. Pre-
sumably, the more confidence in an attitude or the more salient
the attitude in memory, the more likely it is that the attitude can
and will be acted on. However, sometimes direct experience is
not enough. If an evaluation of an object based on direct experi-
ence lacks sufficient clarity La inform the person about the ob-
ject, then forming an attitude based on the objective reality ofdi-
rect experience becomes difficult (Ha & Hoch, 1989; Hoch &
Ha, 1986). In these cases, a person may rely on the social reality
of external information from others. Therefore, the extent to
which a consumer relies on one basis for attitude construction
versus another depends on thediagnosticity of each input when a
judgment is called for (Feldman & Lynch, 1988).
Theoretical Summary and Hypotheses
The relative impact of external information from others and a
person's own direct experience with an attitude object on the
temporary construction of attitudes should depend on at least
two factors: (a) the salient evaluative goals of the individual,
and, (b) any differential evaluative implications of thinking
about the object in terms of external information from others
or direct experience with the object. When people's thoughts
and attention are focused on forming an attitude, then infor-
mation will be processed as it is encountered. Thus, an atti-
tude might be formed based on initial information and then
adjusted for subsequent information (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). When people need to come up with an attitude on the
spot, they may seek to retrieve the most easily accessible and
diagnostic information relative to the judgment from memory
(Feldman & Lynch, 1988). Thus, in this case, an attitude will
be formed based on the most recent information. This line of
reasoning leads to the following two hypotheses.
HI: When consumers are in an evaluative (nonevaluative)
state ofmind, they will construct attitudes by focusing
more on initial (recent) information schemas that they
encounter(ed).
H2: The relative diagnosticity (i.e., valence) of each
schema will moderate the impact ofexternal informa-
tion and direct experience on judgment.
STUDY 1
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of study I is to examine the impact of salient
evaluative goals on the accessibility of inputs (external infor-
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mation from others and direct experience) and its subsequent
impact on attitude construction. In study I, the focal attitude
object was an advertisement, not an actual brand or product.
This was done to maximize the likelihood of attitude con-
struction (i.e., making sure that participants did not have pre-
existing attitudes to retrieve).
Overview of Study 1
In this study, participants constructed attitudes toward the ad-
vertisement with two possible schemas available: (a) external
information from others about the advertisement, and (b) di-
rect experience with the advertisement. Specifically, partici-
pants were exposed to external information from others about
the object (via learning about others' ratings of the advertise-
ment) and also directly experienced the object (via exposure
to the actual advertisementj.I
The two different bases for attitude construction had dif-
ferent implications for judgment based on design of the stim-
ulus materials. Direct experience of the advertisement was
pretested and designed to be relatively neutral (approxi-
mately 4 on a I to 7 scale).3 The external information was de-
signed to be either very positive or very negative (to be
described later). Based on our hypotheses, the temporary con-
struction ofattitudes based on this valenced external informa-
tion from others and neutral direct experience will be a
combination of these inputs (as illustrated in Figure I and ex-
plained more fully later).
In study I, we also manipulated the salience ofgoals by putt-
ing participants into an evaluative frame of mind (or not). We
did this by having participants make either online (evaluative) or
delayed (nonevaluative) judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986). We
also varied the order in which participants were exposed to the
two different pieces of information (external information about
the advertisement and direct experience with the advertisement)
to demonstrate the efficacy of the salient goal manipulation and
to show the differential impact ofeach schema on the temporary
construction of participants' attitudes.
Specifically, when the salient goal is evaluative (i.e., the
person focuses on forming an attitude), initial information
will have a greater impact on judgment than subsequent infor-
2This research focusesonevaluationsof theadvertisement perse. Hence.
directexperience withtheadoccurswhenconsumers actually viewthead. If
thefocalobjectunderconsideration is thebrandoractualproduct, thendirect
experience occurswhentheconsumeractuallytriesthebrandor product.As
onereviewerpointedout, thisisreflectedinextantliterature whereactual ex-
perience is contrasted withad exposure.
~Thirty-two advertisements were randomly chosen from magazines
judged to be familiarto and read by the participant pool. Participants were
askedtouse7-pointLikert-type scalestoratethe32advertisements onseven
dimensions of advertising appeal. Theseevaluationswere made in the ab-
senceofanyadditional externalinfonnation. Pretestresultsshowedthatnine
adswerejudgedto beapproximately neutralon a meanscoreof thesevendi-
mensions. Threeof theseadswerechosenasstimulusreplicates. See Figure2
for the threeads usedin both studiespresented in this article.
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FIGURE 1 Temporary construction of altitudes based on Direct experience (neutral) and external information (positive/negative}.
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FIGURE 2 Experimental advertising stimulus replicates.
marion (a primacy order effect). When the salient goal is
nonevaluative (i.e., docs not involve forming an attitude), at-
titudes will be based on information in memory and recent in-
formation will have a greater impact than initial information
(a recency order effect). The design of the stimulus materials
permit us to test for these effects: judgments should be more
extreme (either positive or negative) when participants focus
more on external information from others (either positive or
negative) ratherthan on their own direct experience (neutral).
Method
Participants and experimental design. Study I is a
2 (Order oflnformation) x 2 (Valence) x 2 (Goal) x 3 (Stimu-
lus Replicate) between-subjects design with three No-Influ-
ence control groups. A total of 273 undergraduate business
school students from a major southeastern university partici-
pated in the study for extra credit.
Procedure. The cover story for this experiment askcd
participants to assess a market research portfolio. The infor-
mation packet was a portfolio giving examples of the adver.
tising firm's marketing research reports to be presented to po-
tential clients. These reports included example data charts
that depicted information and effectiveness ratings of the
company's advertisements collected in past studies. Partici-
pants were urged to work through the packet at a brisk pace.
On entering the lab for the experiment, participants were ran-
domly assigned to experimental conditions.
Goal was manipulated such that participants either evalu-
ated the advertisements (evaluative goal) or proofread the ad-
vertising material (nonevaluative goalj.! Participants in the
4A proofreading goal was deemed sufficient to discourage participang,
from evaluating the ad (Park & Hastak, 1994). Participants in the proofrea.].
ing condition were later surprisingly asked to rate the advertisement In the
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FIGURE 3 Example of positive external information manipulation.
evaluative condition were told ahead of time that they would
rate an example advertisement designed by the advertising
firm. Participants in the nonevaluative condition were told
that they were to proofread the market research material. Par-
ticipants saw one ofthree different ads in their portfolio mate-
rials (serving as Stimulus Replicates); these ads are illustrated
in Figure 2.
Because the focal attitude object under consideration
was the advertisement, participants' subjective experi-
ence of a full size color copy of the actual advertisement
provided in the packet constituted direct experience with
the advertisement. Secondhand information provided in
market research portfolio. The solicitation of proofreading comments in the
postexercise questionnaire was expected to lend credence to the proofreading
goal manipulation in the context of the cover story. In addition, a brief ratio-
nale was provided to participants to explain the need for proofreading com-
ments (i.e., to test to what extent they affect advertisement evaluations).
the form of market research data that had already 'been
collected during prior research by the pseudo advertising
firm constituted external information from others. Va-
lence (i.e., diagnosticity) of this external information
from others was manipulated as positive or negative via
the distribution of other people's ratings depicted in the
histogram chart. Figure 3 shows an example of the posi-
tive external information manipulation.
The ads themselves were pretested to beevaluatively neu-
tral. In addition, the order of presentation was manipulated:
participants either saw the advertisement followed by the ex-
ternal information from others (direct experience first) or saw
the external information followed by the advertisement (ex-
ternal information first). After working through their packet,
participants completed a postexercise questionnaire that
gathered their proofreading comments and also measured
their attitude toward the ad (pleasant, new, convincing, ap-
pealing, lively, interesting, and meaningful) on I to 7 scales.
These dimensions were the dependent measure for study I.
TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Conditions
Valence ofExternal
Salient Goal Order In/ormation N M SD
Ad I
I. Evaluative Ad-Rat (+) 12 4.58 0.47
2. Evaluative Rat-Ad (+) 12 5.43 0.25
3. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (+) 12 5.71 0.20
4. Nonevaluative Rat-Ad (+) II 4.29 0.55
5. Evaluative Ad-Rat (-) 10 4.54 0.52
6. Evaluative Rat-Ad (-) 11 1.65 0.33
7. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (-) 10 2.70 0.39
8. Nonevaluative Rat-Ad (-) II 4.18 0.43
Ad2
1. Evaluative Ad-Rat (+) II 4.40 0.46
2. Evaluative Rat-Ad (+) II 6.52 0.22
3. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (+) 11 5.38 0.33
4. Nonevaluative Rat-Ad (+) II 4.14 0.51
5. Evaluative Ad-Rat (-) 12 4.41 0.45
6. Evaluative Rat-Ad (-) 12 2.75 0.33
7. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (-) II 2.77 0.43
8. Nonevaluative Rat-Ad (-) II 3.82 0.53
Ad3
I. Evaluative Ad-Rat (+) II 4.18 0.53
2. Evaluative Rat-Ad (+) II 5.68 0.24
3. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (+) II 5.27 0.28
4. Nonevaluative Rat-Ad (+) II 4.13 0.54
5. Evaluative Ad-Rat H II 4.19 0.50
6. Evaluative Rat-Ad (-) 16 2.69 0.38
7. Nonevaluative Ad-Rat (-) 12 2.80 0.42





Note. Orderrefers to orderof exposureto Ad(directexperience) and Ratings(external information fromothers);Rat=
ratings. Meansin boldare significantly differentfrom theircontrolgroup(p < .05).
Results
An overall ad evaluation measure wasconstructed by averag-
ingratingson the measured dimensions (Cronbach coefficient
alpha of 0.921).Mean evaluations of the advertisements as a
function of experimental designfactors are shownin Table I.
An analysisof variance (ANOVA) revealsa significant 3-way
interaction of goal, order, and valence of information, F( I,
265)=625.42, P=.0001.5 Figure4 showsa graphof themean
'For easeof presentation. wehavecollapsedacrosstheadStimulusRepli-
cates. Ananalysisof varianceincludingthis factorrevealeda 4-wayinterac-
tion of Ad Stimulus Replicate. Goal.Orderof Information. and Valence of
evaluation of all theadvertisements as a function of evaluative
slate(goal), order,and valence (diagnosticity) treatments. Fol-
low-upanalyses revealed the predicted effectson attitudes:
External Information, F(2, 249) = 2.92,P = .056. However, the interaction
withadstimulusis theoretically uninteresting, merelyreflecting differences
in theimpactof theadstimuli.Thisis evidentin themeansforeachadstimu-
lusthatarereportedinTable I, andwasconfirmed byfinding a similar3-way
interaction foreachadstimulus.Thus.ourconclusions wouldnotdifferif this
fullanalysiswerereportedandwecansafelycollapseacrossadstimuliwith-
out lessening theconservatismof ourhypothesis testing.Asanaddedbenefit.
























FIGURE 4 Meanattitudes toward the advertisements as a function of evaluativestate.valence. and orderinfonnation(Study 1).
Whim participants had an evaluative goal salient during
stimulus exposure, the order and valence of information in-
teracted, F(I, 136) =360.05, P =.0001. When participants
saw positiveexternal information first, theirjudgmentswere
morepositive thanwhen theyexperiencedthe relatively neu-
tral ad first, F(1,66) = 138.58, P =.0001. When participants
saw negativeexternal information first, theirjudgmentswere
morenegativethanwhentheyexperiencedthe relatively neu-
tral ad first, F( 1,70) =226.4, p =.000 I. Whenthesalientgoal
was nonevaluative during stimulusexposure(i.e., proofread-
ing conditions), the order and valence of information inter-
actedand revealedtheoppositepatternof results,F( I. 129) =
270.87, p =.0001. When participants saw positiveexternal
information second, theirjudgments weremorepositivethan
when theyexperienced the relatively neutralad second,F( I,
65) =145.80, P= .OOO\. When participantssaw negative ex-
ternal information second, their judgments were more nega-
tive than when they experienced the relatively neutral ad
second, F(I , 64) =126.14, P =.000 I. Thus, a primacyeffect
was obtained under an evaluative goal and a recency effect
was obtained under a nonevaluative goal. These results are
consistent with the hypotheses.
An alternative analysis also supports our proposal that sa-
lient goals affect the relative impact of external information
and direct experience on the construction of attitudes. Spe-
cifically, planned contrasts were conducted of the judgments
of participants predicted to weightdirect experience with the
ad more(groups 1,4,5, and8)againstthejudgmentsofpartici-
pants predicted to weight external information more heavily
(i.e.,positive external information forgroups2and3andnega-
tiveexternal information forgroups6 and7). Means for these
planned contrasts differed in the expected direction. Partici-
pants predicted to weight positive external information pro-
vided more positive judgments compared to participants
predicted toweightdirectexperience moreheavily, F( 1,270) =
337.11, p = .0001. Similarly, participants predicted to weight
negative external information more heavily provided more
negative judgments compared to participants predicted to
weight directexperience moreheavily, F(1,270)=490.88,P=
.000I. Theseresultsare also consistent with the hypotheses.
Overall, the pattern of means supports an explanation
basedon anchoringandadjustment.Withan evaluativegoal,
participants anchor on initial information (either the rela-
tivelyneutralad itself or valencedexternal information from
others) and then adjust for subsequentinformation (hence, a
primacyeffect). With a nonevaluative goal, participantsan-
chor on more recent information recalled from memory and
then adjust for information presented earlier (hence, a re-
cency effect).
Discussion
Study I demonstrates how salientgoals, valence, and orderof
information interact andinfluence attitude construction. An an-
choring and underadjustment heuristic nicely predicts the tem-
porary construction of attitudes in this study. That is, anitudes
were moreextreme when anchored on valenced external infor-
mation from others andadjusted for relatively neutral directex-
perience. Conversely, attitudes were less extreme when an-
chored on relatively neutral directexperience and adjusted for
valenced external information from others. Thesalient goaland
orderof information togetherdetermine theinputsonwhichatti-
tudes areanchored andthenadjusted. Whenanevaluativegoalis
salientduring exposure toinputs,judgmentsareanchored onini-
tial information (reflecting a primacy order effect). When a
nonevaluative goal is salient, judgments areanchored on recent
information (reflecting a recency effect). Interestingly, these re-
sults illustrate quiteclearly the potential for fluctuation in ani-
tudes thatare temporarily constructed.
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Consider judgments made when an evaluative goal was
salient. As study I demonstrated, direct experience had a
greater impact when it preceded external information from
othersunderan evaluativegoal; incontrast,external informa-
tion had a greater impact when it precededdirect experience
under an evaluative goal. This finding provides evidence of
how a person's initial direct experience appears to diminish
the subsequent impact of others' opinions, whereas others'
opinions appear to diminish the subsequent impact of a per-
son's direct experience. For example, reading a thumbs-up
movie review before seeing a mediocre movie may lead to
more positivejudgments of the movie than if one had viewed
the movie first and then read the reviews.Similarly,negative
word-of-mouth beforeseeinga mediocremoviemightlead to
more negativejudgments of the movie than if the movie was
viewedbeforehearingothers' reviews.The moviesituationis
an example in whichpeopleseem very likelyto havea salient
evaluative goal.
However, for other attitude objects, people may be less
likely to have a salient evaluativegoal. For example, people
maybe exposedto information abouta productbeforean atti-
tudeis requiredtoguidebehavior. However, whena laterneed
arisesto fonn ajudgmentbasedon memory, morerecentinfor-
mation may be easier to retrieve and may receive greater
weight in constructing an attitude (as was demonstrated in
study I).Suchrecentinputstojudgmentmayincludeeitherex-
ternal infonnationfromothersordirectexperiencewiththeat-
titude object. For example, my brother and his wife have
purchased a newset of kitchenappliances. When I visit, I gain
directexperience withtheirappliances andalsoheartheiropin-
ionsof various brands,but I am notmotivated to makemyown
judgment until I later encountera need to do so whenbuying
my own set of kitchenappliances. In this case, the opinionof
my brotherand his wifeis likelyto havegreaterweighton my
judgment if it was more recently heardand therefore is more
easilyrecalled thanmyowndirectexperience withappliances.
(Ofcourse,otherfactors alsoaffecteaseof retrieval; thisexam-
ple assumesceteris paribusconditions.)
THE TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION OF
ATTITUDES: A FURTHER TEST OF
ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT
The pattern of effects found in study I strongly argues for an
anchoringand adjustment explanation-which we believe is
consistentwith the idea of attitudeconstruction and the inter-
play of the two bases for attitude formation examined in the
study.To providefurther evidencefor temporary attitudecon-
structionbased on direct experienceand external information
from others, we conducted a second study that employs a
well-established phenomenon as a boundary condition on the
attitudeconstruction processesobserved in study I. Consider
theearliertofuexample.Assumethata consumerformsa neg-
ativeattitudetowardtofubasedon somecombination ofdirect
experiencewith the tofu along withexternal information. De-
spitedislikingtofu,thisconsumermayexpressa favorable atti-
tude toward tofu to impress a new friend who likes tofu and
servesit at a special dinner.Thiscircumstance isanexampicof
an externalcontingency that moderatesattitudeexpression.
Theoretical Summary and Hypotheses
The notion that people express attitudes consistent with re-
ward-mediating social referents is a well-established finding
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Research onaccountability (expecting
tohavetojustify one's opinions toothers) alsosuggests thatpeo-
plewill conform totheviews ofothers when suspected or known
(Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger. 1989; fora morerecent synthesis,
see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Considerable extant research
informs usthatattitudes thatarcgenerated canoften beoverridden
by external contingencies. Kelman (1961) defined compli-
ance-based processes of social influence as influence attempts
thatdo notresult in trueattitude change. Cornpliance-driven pro-
cesseshavealsobeen called nonnative influence orreward power
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; French & Ra-
ven, 1959). They arc often the result of theexpectations of how
others will interpret anexpressed attitude. Thus, theexpectations
of others can act as an external contingency that superficially
guides behavior and affects the expression of temporarily-con-
structed attitudes.
We employ the aforementioned phenomenon to establish
a boundary condition on the attitude construction process
demonstratedin study I. We argue that participantsconstruct
temporaryattitudes based on external information from oth-
ers or direct experience,anchoring on the most salient infor-
mation and adjusting for less salient information. However,
as the tofuexample illustrates,theexpressionof attitudescan
also be influencedby an externalcontingencysuch as theex-
pectationsof others. If anexpectation(e.g., the favorable atti-
tudeof another) is salientand indicatesthata specificattitude
(e.g., liking tofu) will lead to some favorable outcome (e.g..
desired friendship), then this contingency may moderate the
evaluative implications of attitudes that are constructed. In
other words, the expression of an attitude will be moderated
by the external contingency(i.e., the expectations of others).
This leads to the following hypothesis.
H3: Whenparticipants arc awarethata third party might re-
ward them forhaving a certain attitude. they will no lon-
ger systematically anchoron prior or recent information
toward theattitude object andadjust fordiagnostic alter-
native inputs. Rather, participants will conform to theex-
pected views ofthethird party when expressing attitudes.
STUDY 2
Purpose of the Study
The purposeof study2 is to provide furtherevidencethat par-
ticipants indeed anchor on initial (recent) informational in-
puts in an evaluative (nonevaluative) state and construct their
attitudes via an anchoring and adjustment process that is
moderated by the evaluative diagnosticity (valence) of exter-
nal information and direct experience. We attempt to provide
further evidence for the temporary construction of attitudes
by relying on the weIl-established phenomenon that the ex-
pectation of others moderates attitude expression.
Overview of Study 2
Study 2 is a partial replication of study I but also includes an
external contingency manipulation; that is, we manipulated
participants' expectations of how others wiIl interpret their
attitudes. Half of the participants were led to believe that the
marketing firm that is conducting the research may contact
them. The logic of this manipulation relies on establishing an
expectation derived from participants' desire to obtain re-
wards via a social relationship with the market research firm.
SpecificaIly, half of the participants believe that the market
research firm wiIl invite the use of participants' comments in
a subsequent ad campaign on behalf of the firm in which the
participants wiIl be paid. As a result, participants expect that
the market research firm wiIl prefer to obtain favorable re-
sponses from participants. The major prediction of study 2 is
that expectations driven by an external contingency (i.e., the
financial reward from the marketing research firm) will affect
the expression of their attitudes. In other words, the relative
impact of external information from others and direct experi-
ence on the expression of attitudes should be moderated by
this additional social influence component.
Method
Participants and experimental design. A total of
118 undergraduate business students from a major south-
eastern university were randomly assigned to conditions in
a procedure and cover story that was similar to study I. The
experiment is a 2 (External Contingency) x 2 (Goal) x 2
(Order ofInformation) x I (Negative External Information
Only) x 2 (Stimulus Replicate) between subjects factorial
design."
Procedure. As in the firststudy,participants wereasked
to assessa marketing research portfolio. Half of the participants
were informed that it was highly likely that they mightbe con-
tactedandcompensated fortheuseof theircomments bythecom-
pany in futureadvertisement and marketresearch presentations,
thereby creating an External Contingency. After receiving this
manipulation (or not),participants thenworked through booklets
containing the directexperience and external information. As in
61nstudy2.we usedtwoof theads fromstudy I. Wehavecollapsedacross
ad stimuluswhenreportingour results.Wealso usedonly negativeinforma-
tion fromothers given the logic of theexternal contingency manipulation.
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study I, goal was manipulated such that participants either
evaluated the advertisements (evaluative goal) or proofread the
advertising material (nonevaluative goal). Participants saw oneof
twodifferent ads in theirportfolio materials (serving as Stimulus
Replicates). Orderof infonnation was manipulated: participants
eithersawtheadvertisement followed by theexternalinformation
from others(directexperience first) or saw theexternal informa-
tion followed by theadvertisement (external infonnationfirst).
(Asbefore, theadswerepretested tobeevaluatively neutral. Only
negative external infonnationfromothers wasusedinthisstudy.)
After working through their packet, participants completed a
postexercise questionnaire thatgathered theirproofreading com-
mentsand also measured theirattitudetowardthe ad.
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked anadmin-
istrative question that assessed theextent to which they would findit
desirable tohavetheircomments used ina futureadveJtisement (J'I'O-
search portfolio by thepseudoodvertising firm (ona 1-7scale). Par-
ticipants intheexternal contingency treatment groups were expected
to showa stronger desire to assess theadvertising infoonationin a
more favorable way.7 Results showed that participants intheextemal
contingency treatment groups rated it more desirable to havetheir
comments used than participants not receiving theexternal contin-
gency manipulation~'Y =4.58,M~ =3.59), FlI,
115) =23.98,p < .cXXH.
Results
An overall ad evaluation measure was constructed by aver-
aging ratings on the measured dimensions (Cronbach coeffi-
cient alpha of 0.898). Mean evaluations of the advertise-
ments as a function of experimental design factors are
shown in Table 2 and Figure 5. An ANDVA of the experi-
mental groups reveals a significant 3-way interaction of sa-
lient goal, order of information, and external contingency,
F( I, 110) =30.74, P =.0001. Follow-up analyses revealed
the following effects:
Under noexternal contingency, goal and orderofinfoima-
tion interactedas predicted, F( 1,55) =64.63,p= .000I. When
participants saw negative external information first with an
evaluative goal, their judgments were more negative than
when they experienced the relatively neutral ad first, F( 1,27)
=85.55, p = .000I. When participants with a nonevaluative
(proofreading) goal saw negative ratings information second,
their memory-based judgments were expected to be more
negative than when they experienced the relatively neutral ad
second. Although in the expected direction, the mean differ-
ence was not significant, F( I, 28) =1.43,p =.243. Under an
external contingency, goal and order of information did not
711 is assumedthatif participants indicatedthatit wasdesirablefor themto
havetheircommentsused.they wouldbe motivatedto rate thestimulimore
favorably becausetheparticipants wouldassumethat thecompanywouldbe
moreinclined to use favorable evaluationsfor testimonial purposes.
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FIGURE 5 Meanattitudestowardthe advertisements as a function of evaluativestate. valence. and order information (Study2).
TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 2 Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment and Conditions
External Contingency Salient Goal Order N M SD
I. NoContingency Evaluative Ad-Rat 15 4.14 0.53
2. No Contingency Evaluative Rat-Ad 14 2.17 0.62
3. No Contingency Nonevaluative Ad-Rat 15 3.84 0.63
4. NoContingency Nonevaluative Rat-Ad 15 4.04 0.16
5. Contingency Evaluative Ad-Ral 15 5.64 0.40
6. Contingency Evaluative Rat-Ad 14 4.69 o.:n
7. Contingency Nonevaluative Ad-Rat 15 5.69 0.58
8. Contingency Nonevaluative Rat-Ad 15 5.27 0.44
9. Control 4.14 0.44
Note. Orderreferstoorderof exposureto Ad(directexperience) andRatings (external information from others);Rat= ratings. Means in bold
are significantly differentfrom the control(p < .05).
significantly interact, F(1,55) =1.45,P=.233.8 All attitudes
were significantly greater than neutral (all ps < .(01) in the
four treatment groups where there was an external contin-
gency. Expressed attitudes werepositivedespite the fact that
external information was negativeand direct experiencewas
neutral, reflecting the impactof the external contingency on
evaluations.
'There was.however.a maineffectof salientgoal. F(I. 55) = 17.11. P =
.0001.and order of information, 1"(1, 55) = 57.78. P= .0001.Participants'
judgmentswerelesspositivewhenmadeunderanevaluativegoaland when
negativeinformation fromothers precededdirect adexperience. Although
nospecificpredictionsweremadefor the ordereffect. the maineffectof sa-
lientgoal is consistentwith our predictions.
An alternative analysis also supports the predictions of
this study.Specifically, plannedcontrastswereperformed on
the judgments of participants predicted to more heavily
weight theirdirect experiencewith the (neutral)ad (groups 1
and4) againstthejudgmentsof participantspredictedtomore
heavilyweight(negative)external information (groups2 and
3) and against the judgments of participants predicted to be
affected by the (positive)external contingency(groups 5. 6.
7, and8).Meansfor theseplannedcontrastsdifferedintheex-
pecteddirection. Participants predictedto rely moreonexter-
nal information provided morenegative judgmentscompared
to participants predicted to more heavily weight their direct
experience with the ad, F(I, 115)=33.24,P = .0001. Simi-
larly,participants predictedto beaffectedbytheexternalcon-
tingency provided more positive judgments compared to
participants predicted to rely on their own direct experience,
F(I, 115) =68.88, P =.0001.
This is particularly striking because (what appeared to us
to be) a relatively mild manipulation of an external contin-
gency (advising participants that they might be contacted by
the market research firm and receive some compensation for
their opinions) had a strong (positive) impact on judgment,
despite conflicting with other available information (negative
external information or neutral direct experience) on which to
construct and express an altitude.
Discussion
Overall, the results of study 2 are consistent with predic-
tions. Varying the order of negative external information
and neutral direct experience produces empirical results
that are consistent with the anchoring-and-adjustment ex-
planation posited in study I. Participants combine direct
experience and external information from others in form-
ing evaluations. The relative influence on these inputs de-
pends on their salience at the time of evaluation. Further-
more.an external contingency was also shown to influence
the attitudes expressed by participants. This finding in and
of itself is not new and it is not our purpose to demonstrate
it. Rather, we believe that an additional test of the anchor-
ing and adjustment explanation can be conducted by rely-
ing on the well-established finding in the social influence
literature that people will express attitudes consistent with
a reward-mediating third party. In fact, our predictions
were confirmed by the data. When participants thought
that a favorable attitude would gain some desirable out-
come, they expressed such an attitude even when it con-
flicted with both the evaluative implications ofexternal in-
formation from others and their own direct experience.
This finding suggests that participants did not systemati-
cally anchor on prior or recent diagnostic information but
rather rely on the evaluative implications of the external
contingency in expressing an attitude. In other words, atti-
tude expression was the result of a dynamic construction
process based on salient informational inputs and moder-
ated by external contingencies.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
LIMITATIONS
Attitudes can be constructed in various ways (Schwarz &
Bohner, 2(00). Two such bases for attitude formation are (a)
external information from others about the attitude object,
and (b) one's own direct experience with the object. In the
current empirical work, evidence suggests that the salient
processing goal and the evaluative implications of different
schemas or bases on which to form attitudes affect the tempo-
rary construction of attitudes. In study I, attitudes are con-
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structed from direct experience and external information. Sa-
lient goals and order of information jointly influence attitude
formation. Furthermore, this explanation was supported in
study 2. In the absence of an external contingency, goals, va-
lence, and order of information influenced attitude construc-
tion and expression in a manner consistent with anchoring
and adjustment. Study 2 also demonstrated that external con-
tingencies (such as the expectations of others) can intervene
between the construction and subsequent expression of atti-
tudes based on external information and direct experience.
Rewards and punishments linked to the consequences of be-
haviors can motivate people to express attitudes that gain a fa-
vorable reaction from others. Similarly, expecting to have to
justify one's opinion to others (i.e., accountability to the mar-
keting research firm) can also lead people to conform to the
known or suspected views of others. The external contin-
gency in study 2 (that participants may be contacted by the
marketing research firm) seems to have motivated partici-
pants to express attitudes that were more favorable (i.e., in
line with the firm's expectations).
Thus, external contingencies such as normative influence
can affect behavior or expressed attitudes through a compli-
ance-based process (Kelman, 1961) without affecting true,
underlying attitudes. In contrast, an influence is internalized
when a person perceives "others in the group as mediators of
fact" (Burnkrant & Cousineau, 1975. p. 207). Thus, informa-
tional influence occurs when external information (ratings
from others) is used in forming an attitude (in combination
with direct experience). Empirical results from study I and
the no-external-contingency groups in study 2 appear to re-
flect internalization during attitude construction, whereas the
external-contingency groups in study 2 reflect compliance
during attitude expression. Therefore, we take this combined
pattern of results across these studies as convergent evidence
for the anchoring and adjustment explanation of the tempo-
rary construction ofconsumer attitudes toward the advertise-
ments and the moderation of subsequent attitude expression
by external contingencies.
Although empirical results in this study support predic-
tions, some limitations must be noted. Although the overall
results of study 2 are supportive, there are two anomalous
findings. First. we did not find the predicted simple effect of
order when participants with a nonevaluative goal formed at-
titudes under no external contingency. Specifically, the mean
(in cell 3 ofTable 2) is not as negative as predicted ifattitudes
are being formed by anchoring on recent negative ratings in-
formation and underadjusting for earlier neutral direct experi-
ence. (Although it is directionally lower than neutral, the
equivalent cell 7 means in study I were more negative.) Sec-
ond. we did not predict the main effect oforderof information
in the presence of an external contingency. Taken together,
these results could be interpreted as casting some doubt on the
efficacy of our manipulation of salient evaluative goals. If
participants spontaneously adopted an evaluative goal in the
nonevaluative condition, this would reduce the likelihood of
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finding the predicted recency effect. It would also explain the
main effect of order of information in the external contin-
gency conditions. Indeed, the pattern of means is consistent
with the notion that the impact of an external contingency on
attitudes is at least somewhat constrained by direct experi-
ence and external information. Specifical1y, attitudes were
less positive when negative information preceded the direct
experience of neutral ad information than vice versa-per-
haps because participants spontaneously tended to make
judgments online so initial negative information pulled down
attitudes. In addition, judgments were more positive when
participants did not have an evaluative goal-perhaps be-
cause there is more room for biased interpretation of direct
experience and external information recalled from memory
(rather than stimulus based). Nonetheless, our prediction is
supported: an external contingency in the form of expecta-
tions from others had direct effects on the construction ofatti-
tudes in a way that further supports the anchoring and
adjustment explanation posed earlier.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
It seems reasonable to assume that we do not carry around at-
titudes toward the vast array of situated entities toward which
judgments are needed. The fluidity ofmany ofour attitudes is
well-established (Bishop, 1987; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Wil-
son & Hodges, 1992), thereby supporting the view that such
evaluative judgments might be based on the most accessible
and diagnostic information available to the individual at that
time. The more extreme constructionist view holds that atti-
tudes are no different from any other cognition and are con-
structed at that moment out of both accessible information
and comparison frames, the latter sometimes producing as-
similation or contrast effects (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998;
Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Schwartz, 1978; Schwarz, 2000;
Tesser & Martin, 1996; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). It is
not surprising that some attitudes studied in the laboratory
setting appear to be somewhat fluid because these expres-
sions of attitude are likely to be ill-formed or weakly held to
begin with. However, a constructionist viewpoint on attitudes
does not necessarily imply that people do not have attitudes.
People will have attitudes toward very important objects that
they care about.
Our research is rooted in the notion that these conflicting
viewpoints can be reconciled by examining the factors that
influence attitude generation and retrieval. The studies in this
article focus on several factors that influence attitude con-
struction and expression. For example, in this article, we as-
sumed that individuals can construct their attitudes based on
relevant schemas, namely external information and direct ex-
perience. Fazio and his colleagues argued that, if a person
forms a very negative attitude toward some object by experi-
encing that object, then this negative attitude will probably
have more impact than a very negative attitude formed on the
basis of simply reading about the object. We agree. but we
suggest that this is only part of the story. People may access an
attitude directly from memory (as Fazio's work points out),
but if such an attitude is not available or accessible from
memory, a person may construct an attitude on the spot (as is
consistent with other theorizing in the attitude literature;
Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Lynch, Marmorstein, & Weigold,
1988; Lynch & Srull, 1982). We argue that the construction of
this potentially temporary attitude will be based on salient
evaluative information and examine two potential sources:
external information and direct experience. Our results sug-
gest that both external information and direct experience may
serve as evaluative inputs in attitude construction-a finding
consistent with Fazio's research and also Fishbein's expec-
tancy-belief model of attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
However, our research also takes into account the influence
of goals and the valence and order of information exposure.
Salient evaluative or nonevaluative goals, valence, and or-
der of information determine the relative influence of inputs
in attitude construction. Moreover, an external contingency
moderates the expression of constructed attitudes. If con-
text-dependent activation leads to the expression of different
attitudes, any individual might possess or at least have the po-
tential to construct muILiple context-dependent attitudes
(Wilson & Hodges, 1992). All of this implies that the concept
ofan attitude as a relatively long-lasting, stable mental repre-
sentation might need to be reexamined (Schwarz & Bohner.
2(00). More generally, this raises the issue of whether judg-
ments and behavior depend on the retrieval of abstract knowl-
edge or on dynamically constructed combinations of
individually retrieved episodes (Wilson et al., 2(00). For ex-
ample, Zanna and Rempel's (1988) model of attitudes sug-
gested that attitudes can be based on cognitive information
(as suggested by expectancy value approaches), affective in-
formation (attitudes formed through mere exposure or condi-
tioning; Zajonc, 1968a), and behavioral reactions (such as
attitudes formed on the basis of counterattitudinal actions;
Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1957). The nature and the effects of an
attitude may depend on the basis by which it was formed.
Future research on the different schemas or bases for alti-
tudes merits further attention. For example, attitudes can be
activated from memory and triggered by cues related to the at-
titude object (Fazio, 1986, 1989; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio,
1990). Attitudes can also be generated by direct experience
with the attitude object (Fazio & Zanna, 1978b; Regan &
Fazio, 1977; Songer-Nocks, 1976) or by affective feel-
ing-based information generated by imagining an experience
with an attitude object (Keller & McGill, 1994; Pham, 1998;
Schwartz, 1990). An attitude can also be based on group iden-
tification and social identity (Terry & Hogg, 1996). If multi-
ple schemas or bases can be used to form an attitude, people
can form muILiple evaluations of the same object depending
on what they can or cannot retrieve about the object and, in-
deed, may even hold dual attitudes toward the same object
(Wilson et. aI., 2(00). Therefore, future research should ex-
amine the complete set of mediating and moderating factors
that increase the likelihood of forming an attitude using a par-
ticular basis for construction.
In our research, participants had relatively pallid direct ex-
perience and external information available to them (for con-
trol purposes). Readers may wonder the following: (a) How
real are the attitudes generated in our studies? and (b) Will
people actually rely on these attitudes to guide their behavior?
These questions raise two issues that deserve attention in fu-
ture research. Simply because an attitude is constructed does
not automaticaIly mean that it will be relied on to guide be-
havior. Therefore. future research should also consider the
different processes by which a generated attitude is assessed
as an appropriate guide for behavior. For example, Fazio and
Towles-Schwen (1999) elaborated on Fazio's (1986) Moti-
vation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model.
This framework suggests a direct and indirect path by which
activated attitudes guide behavior. In the direct path, acti-
vated attitudes bias the subjective perceptions of the attitude
object's qualities, and these qualities in tum guide behavior.
Because a positive (negative) attitude makes the attitude ob-
ject appear to have more positive (negative) qualities, and
those positive (negative) qualities elicit positive (negative)
behaviors. the direct route increases the likelihood of attitude
consistent behavior. In the indirect route of the MODE
model. activated attitudes (in conjunction with norms and be-
havioral control) produce intentions to act. leading to attitude
behavior inconsistency if other inhibitory factors are not pres-
ent (Schuette & Fazio. 1995).
Finally, our research demonstrates an important point re-
garding the fluctuation and stability ofattitudes and the consis-
tency of attitudes. expression of attitudes. and behavior. In
study I. processing goals and valence and order of information
created variation in attitudes. begging the foIlowing question:
Is there a true stable and consistent attitude when attitudes are
constructed temporarily and subject to such influences? In con-
trast. study 2 illustrates how unwavering attitudes can be some-
what misleading-external contingencies can lead to
conformity and an apparent consensus ofevaluative responses
(across participants), in contrast to attitudes expressed in the
absence of such external contingencies.
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